Financing Development in Africa: Trends, Issues and Challenges by Osakwe, Patrick N. & Ben Hammouda, Hakim
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financing Development in Africa:
Trends, Issues and Challenges
Patrick N. Osakwe and Hakim Ben Hammouda
UN Economic Commission for Africa
December 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1815/
MPRA Paper No. 1815, posted 16. February 2007
Financing Development 
in Africa: 
Trends, Issues and Challenges
Hakim Ben Hammouda 
Patrick N. Osakwe
ATPC
Work in Progress
No. 48
African Trade Policy Centre
AT
PC
Economic Commission for Africa
ATPC is a project of the Economic Commission for Africa 
with financial support of the Canada Fund for Africa
December 2006

ATPC
Work in Progress
Economic Commission for Africa
Financing Development in Africa: 
Trends, Issues and Challenges*
Hakim Ben Hammouda
Patrick N. Osakwe
*  We thank Amal Elbeshbishi for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The authors are responsible for any errors and the 
views expressed here do not represent those of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 
ATPC is a project of the Economic Commission for Africa with financial support of the Canada Fund for Africa
This publication was produced with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Material from this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted. Acknowledgement is requested, together with 
a copy of the publication  The views expressed are those of its authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
United Nations.
ECA - CEA
-
iii
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
II. Trends in Financing Development in Africa .................................................................................. 5
III. Assessing the Cost of Financing the MDGs   ............................................................................... 15
IV. Alternative Proposals for Financing the MDGs ........................................................................... 19
V. Initiatives and Commitments on Financing Development .......................................................... 22
VI. Translating Commitments into Results ....................................................................................... 26
VII. Issues arising from Recent Initiatives on Aid and Debt  ............................................................... 35
References .......................................................................................................................................... 41

I. Introduction
The reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, hunger, and starvation in Africa is one of the main 
challenges facing African leaders and the international community. According to the March 2005 report 
of the Commission for Africa, “African poverty and stagnation is the greatest tragedy of our time.” 
Understanding the nature of this tragedy requires and examination of poverty statistics for the developing 
world in the last three decades. In 1970 there were 1.2 billion poor people in the developing world. Of 
this number there were 104 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, 830 million in East Asia, 208 million in 
South Asia, 36 million in Latin America, and 27 million in the Middle East and North Africa (Cooper 
2005). Between 1970 and 2000, there was a tremendous reduction in the number of poor people in the 
developing world. More specifically, the number fell from 1.2 billion in 1970 to 647 million in 2000. 
However, most of the reduction came from East Asia where the number of poor people fell from 830 
million in 1970 to 114 million in 2000. Sub-Saharan Africa happens to be the only sub-region where 
there was a tremendous increase in the number of poor people during the period. With a head-count 
ratio of 54.8 percent in 2000, it also has the highest proportion of domestic population that is poor.1 
Several attempts have been made to explain why Africa has such a disproportionately high number of 
poor people and, more generally, determine the causes of poor economic performance in the sub-region 
(Collier and Gunning 1999; Sachs et al. 2004). What is emerging from this literature is that the lack of 
high and sustained economic growth in the region is a critical factor responsible for the region’s inability 
to make significant progress in the fight against poverty. It is also becoming clear that the nature and 
character of growth is important in terms of increasing prospects for poverty reduction. In particular, for 
growth to have a significant positive impact on poverty it has to be pro-poor in the sense that a higher 
percentage of the benefits accrue to the poorest segments of society. With regards to the historically 
poor growth record of the region, the literature suggests that the following factors are important: 
Political instability and poor governance; macroeconomic instability exacerbated by policy reversals; 
poor investment climate; geography; legacy of colonialism; and an inhospitable external environment as 
reflected in, for example, trade policies in OECD countries that make it difficult for exports of African 
countries to penetrate their markets.
The African region, as well as the Sub-Saharan sub-region, entered the current decade and the new 
Millennium with a relative improvement in economic performance. Relative to the 1980s and the early 
1990s, there has been a marked improvement in economic growth and development in the region. For 
example, over the ten-year period 1988-97, average real per capita output growth was negative (-0.4 
percent). Since 2000, the region has had positive real per capita output growth with a peak of 3.3 percent 
in 2004. Consumer price inflation fell from an average of 29.1 percent over 19988-97 to 8.5 percent 
1   The head-count ratio discussed here is based on Purchasing Power Parity and a poverty line of $1.50 per day. 
2in 2005. The region also moved from a current account deficit of 8.1 percent (of exports of goods and 
services) over the period 1988-97 to a surplus of 5.9 percent in 2000 (see Table 1). These achievements 
have been attributed to positive changes in the region such as: improvements in economic policies, 
reduction in conflicts, better governance, more open trade and investment policies, and improvements in 
commodity prices (ECA 2005; 2006). 
Table 1: Economic Performance in Africa *
1988-97 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP Growth 2.3 (2.3)
3. 
(3.4)
4.2 
(4.2)
3.6 
(3.6)
4.6 
(4.)
5.5 
(5.6)
5.4 
(5.8)
Real per capita GDP growth -0.4 0.8 .9 .4 2.4 3.3 3.2
Consumer Price Inflation 29. (34.6)
3.6 
(7.4)
2.8 
(5.9)
9.9 
(2.2)
0.7 
(3.4)
8.0 
(9.6)
8.5 
(0.7)
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -.2 (-2.3)
-2. 
(-2.5)
-2.3 
(-2.4)
-.4 
(-2.4)
-0.2 
(-0.8)
.5 
(0.4)
Current Account Balance 
 (% of exports)
-8. 
(-9.4)
4.6 
(-0.5)
0.3 
(-6.8)
-5.0 
(-.4)
-.6 
(-8.9)
-0.2 
(-6.5)
5.9 
(-.7)
* The figures in parenthesis are for Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: IMF (2006); ECA (2006)
Despite these relative improvements in economic performance, it is becoming clear that with the current 
growth record the region will not be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of the United 
Nations. A recent study by the Economic Commission for Africa shows that, if current trends continue, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to meet the target of halving the proportion of people whose income is less 
than $1 a day between 1990 and 2015 (ECA 2005). The 2006 Millennium Development Goals report 
also arrived at the same conclusion. The data presented in the report show that between 1990 and 2002 
the number of people living in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 140 million. The 
report also shows that Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind in other areas of the MDGs. Given that the target 
date for meeting the MDGs is 2015 and there is roughly ten years before the deadline, there is the need 
for urgent as well as coordinated actions by African governments and the international community to 
increase the likelihood and prospects for achieving the MDGs in Africa. 
The mobilization of domestic and external finance is critical to success in obtaining resources to finance 
the investment needed to meet the laudable objectives in the Millennium Declaration. Ideally, African 
countries would prefer to use domestic savings to finance the required investments due in part to the fact 
that it is less volatile than most sources of external financing and does not increase their vulnerability 
to external shocks over which they have no control. In addition, unlike official development assistance, 
3domestic savings is not subject to ‘conditionalities’ which could severely limit the policy choices and 
instruments available to governments. Despite these advantages of domestic savings as a source of 
financing, history and recent experience have shown that it is not enough to meet the resource needs of 
African countries. The main reason why domestic savings alone cannot solve Africa’s financing problems 
is that, relative to its investment requirements as well as other developing country regions, Africa saves 
too little. For example, figure 1 shows that over the five-year period 2000-2004, domestic savings as a 
proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) was 17.5 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 26 percent in 
the Middle East and North Africa. In East Asia and the Pacific it was 35.6 percent and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean it was 21.2 percent. 
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Savings across Developing Regions (% of GDP)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Sub-Saharan
Africa
East Asia &
Pacific
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
1990-94 2000-04
Source: Computed using data in WDI 2006.
Clearly, to increase the prospect for sustained growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries in the region must 
find ways to increase domestic savings and channel them into productive investments. The low savings 
ratio of Sub-Saharan African countries has increased the role and importance of external resources in 
financing development in the sub-region. It has also increased the challenges that the sub-region faces in 
financing development. These challenges include: 
• Finding an effective and sustainable solution to the external debt crises facing several African 
countries so as to release resources for development finance;
• How to attract sustained private capital flows, including remittances, and ensure that they are in 
sectors with high valued-added and employment impact;
4• How to improve domestic resource mobilization through increased savings, higher tax revenues and 
reduction of capital flight;
• How to improve the effectiveness and absorptive capacity of foreign aid; and
• How to use international trade as an important vehicle for resource mobilization. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents recent trends in various 
aspects of financing development in Africa. Section III provides a critical appraisal of assessments of 
the costs of meeting the MDGs in Africa and developing countries in general. Section IV presents 
alternative proposals for financing the MDGs and section V deals with the international commitments 
and initiatives on financing development. Section VI examines the extent to which donors have fulfilled 
their commitments and pledges to African countries. The final section of the paper focuses on emerging 
issues arising from recent initiatives on aid and debt.
5II. Trends in Financing Development in Africa
Domestic Savings and Investment
Domestic savings can play a key role in financing development in any economy. It can provide resources 
for investment, boost financial market development, stimulate economic growth, and enable economies 
protect the living standards of ageing populations. According to Rodrik (1998), differences in savings 
rates can explain the difference between thriving and stagnant economies. In particular, countries with 
very impressive growth performance have high savings ratios and have gone through spectacular savings 
transitions. Consequently, domestic savings is fundamental to economic development. 
The mobilization of domestic savings could provide the much needed resources to finance investment 
in economic and social infrastructure in Africa. At the moment, investment ratios are very low in several 
countries in the region. Relative to developing countries in Asia and Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has the lowest investment ratios. For example, over the period 2000-2004, domestic investment as a 
proportion of GDP was 18 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 31 percent in East Asia and the Pacific. 
As can be seen from figure 2, domestic investment ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa is low because domestic 
savings ratio is also low and the region has difficulties attracting sustained private capital flows. Lifting 
this investment and savings constraint is a major challenge for African policymakers and the way in 
which it is dealt with will determine, to a large extent, the region’s ability to achieve sustained economic 
growth in the medium-to-long term.
Figure 2: Investment and Savings Ratios for Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2004)
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6Historically, Sub-Saharan Africa saves less than 20 percent of its GDP. Over the period 1990-1994, the 
average ratio of domestic savings to GDP in the region was 16 percent. There was a slight improvement 
in this ratio to 17 percent over the period 2000-2004. However, as figure 1 show, this number is way 
below the average for East Asia and the Pacific (35 percent), Latin America and Caribbean (21 percent), 
and Middle East and North Africa (26 percent). Concerted efforts must be made by African leaders to 
increase domestic savings if the region is to experience sustained growth and increase the likelihood of 
catching up with other developing country regions. 
The low aggregate savings ratio observed in Sub-Saharan Africa masks the wide differences in savings 
patterns across countries in the region. There are several countries in the region with savings ratio 
comparable to those in East Asia. For example, over the period 2000-2004, five countries--Algeria, 
Botswana, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Nigeria--had savings ratios greater than 30 percent. The ratios 
range from 51 percent in the Republic of Congo to 32 percent in Nigeria. What is interesting about these 
countries is that they are oil and or diamond exporting nations that saw an increase in export revenue due 
to a rise in the price of these commodities. It is therefore not clear whether these countries can sustain 
the current increase in domestic savings especially if there is a decline in the world price of their exports. 
Despite this uncertainty and vulnerability, it is worth noting that the increase in savings has enabled the 
five countries to increase investment ratios, although the increase in the latter is not as large as in the 
former. A key challenge facing these countries, therefore, is how to translate these increases in domestic 
savings into productive investment to ensure and increase prospects for sustained economic growth. 
7Table 2: Classification of Savings Ratios in Africa (2000-2004)
Classification Range List of Countries Number of Countries
High
Savings ratio 
greater than 30 
percent
Algeria, Botswana, Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria 5
Moderate
Savings ratio 
greater than 20 but 
less than or equal to 
30 percent
Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Tunisia 6
Low
Savings ratio is 
positive but less 
than or equal to 20 
percent
Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe
28
Negative Savings ratio less than zero
Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Sierra 
Leone

No data Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia 3
Apart from the five outliers mentioned earlier, 11 countries had negative savings ratios over the period 
2000-2004. Several of these are either in political crises or are post-conflict economies and so it is not 
surprising that they had difficulties mobilizing domestic savings. For example, Sierra Leone and Liberia 
have just emerged from very disruptive political conflicts. There are however countries such as Lesotho 
and Malawi that had negative savings ratios although they did not have any serious political crises during 
the review period. Majority of the other countries in the region had positive but low savings ratio. Table 
2 shows that 28 countries in the region are in this category which is interesting because it includes both 
small and big countries. In particular, it includes a big country such as South Africa that has a developed 
financial system and is expected to have a better ability to mobilize domestic savings.
8The low savings ratio observed in African countries is a consequence of inadequate public and private 
sector savings. Consequently, the government as well as individuals and firms have a role to play in 
boosting savings in the region. On the private side, there is the need to improve access to the banking 
system and also to create an incentive for individuals and firms to save domestically rather than abroad. 
On the public sector side, efforts are needed to boost the ability of governments to mobilize domestic 
resources. This requires the design and reform of current systems of tax collection as well as efficiency 
in the use of public resources. Increasing the government’s ability to mobilise domestic resources is an          
important step towards increasing the predictability of government revenue. African countries face three 
main challenges in their efforts to increase and ensure the predictability of government revenue. The first 
challenge is the instability and uncertainty arising from the volatility of prices of commodities exported 
by African countries. This instability causes an important uncertainty for the public budget and affects 
the ability of governments to finance development. To respond to this challenge, African countries need 
to strengthen efforts to diversify their economies to reduce dependence on commodities. The second 
major challenge facing African countries is to improve the efficiency of the fiscal system. Several studies 
show that the level of revenue from taxes is very low in Africa compared to other developing countries. 
An improvement of the efficiency of the tax system will increase the level of resources obtained by 
African countries (Adam 1999, Agbeyegbe 2004, Bird and Casanegra De and Jantscher 1992, Chambas 
2005). The third challenge facing African countries is how to reduce dependence on trade taxes. For 
example, over the 2000-2003 period, taxes on international trade represented more than 20 percent of 
government revenue in 29 of the 44 countries in Africa for which we had data (Osakwe 2006). Several 
African countries have recently embarked on a series of reforms to reduce their dependence on trade 
taxes. However, considerable efforts still need to be made to strengthen the capacity of the fiscal system 
to collect non-trade taxes. Effective fiscal reforms in African countries are needed to increase the resources 
of governments as well as their capacity to contribute effectively in financing development.
Official Flows 
Recent data suggests that, at the global level, there has been a tremendous increase in the total value of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid from the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and non-DAC donors in the last three decades. Total official flows to all regions of the world 
increased from about US$6.9 billion in 1970 to US$ 68.1 billion in 1991. There was a decline in the 
1990s but this trend has been reversed since the 2000 Millennium Declaration. As at 2004, the figure 
stood at an all-time high of US$87.3 billion. A large part of ODA from DAC donors represents support 
to social and administrative infrastructure. Table 3 shows that over the period 2003-2004, about 34.1 
percent of aid from DAC members went to this category. It represents a big increase in the share of this 
category which was 26.7 percent in the period 1983-1984. Commodity aid and programme assistance 
accounted for 4.1 percent compared to 12.1 percent over the period 1983-84.
9Table 3:  Major Aid Uses (% of total bilateral commitments)
CATEGORY 1983-1984 2003-2004
Social and Administrative Infrastructure 26.7 34.
Economic Infrastructure 8.8 3.
Agriculture .4 3.2
Industry and other Production 8.9 2.6
Commodity Aid and Programme Assistance 2. 4.
Emergency Aid     .6 9.
 Other    20.5 33.7
Source: OECD (2006b)
There has also been an interesting shift in the geographic distribution of official flows. In the 1970s, 
countries in Asia accounted for a large share of ODA. However, since the 1979 oil-price shock, Sub-
Saharan Africa accounts for a larger share of ODA. For example, over the period 1993-94 about 27 
percent of ODA went to Sub-Saharan Africa. The other sub-regions of the world got less than 25 percent. 
For the period 2003-2004, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about 36 percent of ODA (figure 3). This 
increase reflects recent efforts by OECD countries to scale up the volume of aid to Africa to enhance 
prospects for meeting the MDGs. 
Figure 3: Regional Distribution of ODA
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Historically, official flows have played an important role in the economic development of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As is obvious from figure 4, ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa has been on the increase 
since the 1970s. It reached a peak of US$19 billion in 1992 and declined for most parts of the 1990s. 
Since the 2000 Millennium Declaration, however, ODA to the sub-region has been on the increase 
again reaching a peak of US$26 billion in 2004. That said, it should be noted that when expressed as 
a percentage of GDP, ODA to the sub-region in 2004 was 5 percent of GDP which is still below the 6 
percent figure recorded in 1990. 
Within the African region, the distribution of aid flows is uneven with only a few countries accounting 
for a significant percentage of aid flows to the region. For example, in 1990 the big recipients of aid flows 
to the region were: Egypt ($5.4 billion); Kenya ($1.2 billion); Tanzania ($1.2 billion); Morocco ($1.1 
billion); Ethiopia ($1 billion); and Mozambique ($1 billion). The other countries received less than 1 
billion dollars each. As a result of the new focus and priorities given to the region by G8 countries, aid 
flows to several countries in the region has increased. For example, in 2004 each of the following ten 
countries received at least $1 billion dollars of ODA: Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, 
Egypt, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, and Zambia. That said, in per capita terms, 
the main recipients of ODA in the region in 2004 were: Cape Verde ($282); Sao Tome and Principe 
($218); Seychelles ($124); Swaziland ($104); Zambia ($94); and Senegal ($92). 
Since the launch of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1999, there has 
been a change in the composition of aid commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the share of 
project aid in total aid to the sub-region has decreased while that of debt forgiveness has increased from 
under 10 percent in 1990-1994 to about 18 percent over the period 2000-2003. While there has been an 
increase in the relative share of debt forgiveness, over the period 2000-2003, project aid still accounts for 
more than 60 percent of aid commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta, Patillo and Wagh 2006). Given 
the relatively low domestic savings ratios of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the sub-region has and will 
continue to rely on access to ODA as a major source of financing development, except drastic steps are 
taken to boost private capital flows and or mobilize domestic savings. 

Figure 4: ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ millions)
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Source: Computed using data in WDI 2006.
Private Capital Flows 
Private capital flows is another key source of external finance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the late 1990s, it 
was a more important source of external finance to the sub-region. For example, in 1998 and 1999, net 
private flows to the sub-region were 13.7 and 16.7 billion dollars respectively. Over the same period, net 
official flows to the sub-region region were 10.6 and 10.3 billion dollars respectively. Relative to 1999, 
however, net private capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa was low over the years 2000-2002 due in part 
to the impact of the Asian financial crises on investors attitudes towards foreign investment. Since 2003, 
private capital flows to the region has picked up although not as fast as the increase in net official flows 
(table 4).  
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Table 4:  Sources of External Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa 1998-2005 (US$ 
billions)
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Net Private Flows 3.7 6.7 9.9 2. 6.3 5.8 20.7 28.5
    Net equity flows
          FDI inflows
          Portfolio equity inflows
5.5
6.9
8.7
8
9.0
9.0
0.7
6.5
4.2
4
5.0
-.0
9.
9.5
-0.4
4.3
3.6
0.7
8
.3
6.7
24.7
7.6
7.2
    Net debt flows 
         Medium/long term
         Short term
-.8
-.3
-0.5
-.3
-0.7
-0.6
-0.7
0.4
-.
-2
0.
-2.
-2.8
-.0
-.8
.5
2.5
-.0
2.8
.7
.
3.8
2.3
.5
Net Official Flows 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 6.6 23.3 25. 25.2
Bilateral aid grants (excludes technical 
cooperation grants)
0. 9.9 0 0 4 22 24.2 28.4
Net debt flows 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.6 2.6 .2 0.8 -3.2
Source: Global Development Finance 2006
A large part of recent private capital flows to the sub-region are in the form of equity as opposed to 
debt. In 2005, net equity flows accounted for 86 percent of net private capital flows to the sub-region. 
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2002 net debt flows to the region was negative reflecting largely the 
fact that during this period several countries in the region were more interested in servicing existing debt 
rather than accumulating further debt. The decline in the debt-equity ratio of private capital flows in the 
sub-region is a welcome development as it could limit the incidence of debt overhang in several countries 
in the region. It is also interesting to note that there has been a shift in emphasis from short to medium 
and long term debt. This would help to avoid maturity mismatches that have been a feature of debt in 
the region. 
Recent equity flows to the sub-region have also been in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows, as opposed to portfolio equity inflows that are highly volatile and often leave countries vulnerable 
to sudden reversals and investors sentiments. Table 4 shows that since 2000 most equity flows to the region 
has been in the form of FDI. The increasing reliance of African countries on FDI rather than debt should 
be encouraged because it will reduce the accumulation of excessive external debt with the associated debt-
service burden. FDI is also a good source of financing development because it has a potentially important 
role to play in stimulating growth and development. African countries should put in place more effective 
policies to attract FDI and increase their share of development finance from this source. 
3
Table 5: Net Inward Foreign Direct Investment across Regions (US$ Billions)
 Group 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All developing countries 68.7 72.4 83.3 68.8 76.9 60.3 6.6 2.5 237.5
East Asia and Pacific 62. 57.8 50.8 44.3 48.5 57.2 59.8 64.6 65.3
Europe and Central Asia 24.6 27.4 29.8 30.2 32.7 34.9 35.9 62.4 75.6
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 66.7 74. 88.3 79.3 7. 48.2 4. 60.8 6.4
Middle East and North 
Africa 2. 2.7 2.4 4. 3.4 3.7 5.6 5.3 9.
South Asia 4.9 3.5 3. 4.4 6. 6.7 5.6 7.2 8.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.3 6.9 9 6.5 5 9.5 3.6 .3 7.6
     Angola 0.4 . 2.5 0.9 2. .7 3.5 .4 .5
     South Africa 3.8 0.6 .5  7.3 0.7 0.8 0.6 6.3
Source: Global Development Finance 2006
Table 5 shows that the sub-region currently attracts less FDI than most developing countries. That said, 
it should be noted that in 2005 there was a big boost in FDI flows to the Sub-Saharan Africa. Net inward 
FDI flows to the sub-region reached an all-time high of $17.6 billion. According to UNCTAD (2006), 
this rapid increase in FDI flows was due to high commodity prices and rising corporate profits. As in 
previous years, a large percentage of FDI inflows to the sub-region in 2005 went to a few countries. 
South Africa tops the list with inflows of $6.3 billion, followed by Nigeria and Sudan. In North Africa, 
the main recipients are Egypt and Morocco. The large FDI inflow to South Africa was due largely to 
the acquisition of a bank (ABSA) in South Africa by Barclays Bank, United Kingdom, for $5 billion. 
It is also interesting to note that FDI inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 were mainly in the oil 
and gas sector, although there were few investments in services, particularly the banking sector. As in 
previous years, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to face difficulties in attracting significant FDI inflows into 
the manufacturing sector, reflecting largely the lack of diversification of their production structures, low 
human capital base, and poor infrastructure. 
Remittances
In economies with very low domestic savings and poor access to international capital markets, migrant 
workers remittances can play a vital role in development finance. In several regions of the world it is 
indeed growing at an unprecedented rate (figure 5). In 2004 it accounted for 1.5 percent of GDP in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.7 percent in East Asia and Pacific, 2 percent in Latin America and Caribbean, 
4.1 percent in Middle East and North Africa, and 3.6 percent in South Asia. In 2005, the total value of 
4
remittances from all regions was $232 billion which is marginally below the total value of net inward FDI 
to all developing countries (237 billion) for the same year. The true value of remittances may be larger 
given the fact that some remittances are transmitted through informal channels and so are not reflected 
in official statistics. 
Figure 5: Workers Remittances across Developing Regions (US$ millions)
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances are also becoming important. As indicated earlier, in 2004, remittances 
to the sub-region were about 1.5 percent of GDP. Although this is lower than the 5 percent figure 
recorded for ODA in the same year, it is clearly not an insignificant source of financing for the sub-
region. In terms of monetary value, the magnitude of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is still relatively 
small compared to receipts by other developing country regions. For example, estimates available for 
2005, suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa received $8.1 billion in remittances compared to $43 billion and 
$42 billion for East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean respectively. The sub-region 
also received less from this source than countries in South Asia and Middle East and North Africa. That 
said, it should be noted that the low figure reported for Sub-Saharan Africa may be due to the fact that 
relative to other sub-regions, it transfers more remittances through informal channels. It may also be due 
to the fact that financial institutions in the sub-region are less developed than in the other sub-regions 
and so it is more difficult and costly to transfers remittances.
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III. Assessing the Cost of Financing the MDGs  
A key outcome of the September 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit was the specification of 
quantitative targets for poverty reduction and the attainment of goals in areas such as health, education, 
environment, gender equality, child mortality, and global partnership for development. Since the adoption 
of the Millennium Declaration, attempts have been made to assess the cost of meeting the eight goals. 
This usually involves a number of steps. The first is to calculate the growth rate required for a country 
or group of countries to achieve the MDGs based on a given theoretical model and assumptions on the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income. The second step is to compute the investment 
needed to attain this required growth rate and then obtain estimates of the gap between the required 
investment and domestic savings—called financing or resource gap. Given the resource gap, the amount 
of aid needed to meet the MDGs is derived. 
The report of the High Level Panel on Financing for Development, popularly known as the “Zedillo 
Report”, was the first key document to draw attention to the magnitude of resources that would be 
required for poor countries to meet the MDGs. In that report, it was suggested that developing countries 
would need an additional $50 billion per year in order to achieve the MDGs. Similar estimates were 
obtained by Devarajan, Miller and Swanson (2002). They estimated that an additional $54 to $62 billion 
of ODA per year would be required to raise growth rates to the magnitude needed to meet the targets 
for poverty reduction. In particular, they argue that if developing countries improve economic policies 
the additional ODA would be $54 billion per year. However, if the necessary changes in policies and 
institutions are not put in place then about $62 billion would be needed per year in order to meet the 
poverty reduction targets specified in the MDGs. 
These studies focused on global estimates of the cost of meeting the MDGs and so do not have country-
specific results, which to a large extent will depend on country-specific circumstances and policy 
environments. For example, the incidence of wars, quality of economic policies, effectiveness of public 
service delivery, and the degree of inequality in a country will determine progress made by a country in 
meeting the MDGs and hence affect the cost of meeting the goals. Unlike the above-mentioned studies, 
the estimates provided by Sachs et al (2004) suggests that African countries would need an additional 
ODA of $40 per capita each year to achieve the MDGs. In aggregate terms, there finding is that the 
sub-region would need roughly $25 billion in additional ODA per year. They argue that Sub-Saharan 
Africa is stuck in a poverty trap and that only a big-push in the form of scaling up of aid will enhance 
the likelihood of meeting the MDGs in the sub-region. This result is similar to the findings of the March 
2005 report of the Commission for Africa. The report focused on the cost of meeting the MDGs in Sub-
Saharan Africa and suggests that an additional $25 billion per year in aid over three to five years would 
be needed for Sub-Saharan Africa to have a good chance of meeting the MDGs. 
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Kakwani and Son (2006) provide an interesting and country-specific estimate of the cost of meeting 
the MDGs in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast with previous studies, they argue that 
the cost of meeting the MDGs will depend on the expected distribution of income in a country. In 
particular, the costs are likely to be less in economies in which growth is accompanied by a more even 
distribution of income compared to one in which growth leads to increased inequality. Based on their 
estimates for the 15 countries considered, the average per capita growth rate required to meet the 
first MDG for the sample is: 1.51 percent if growth is pro-poor; 2.4 percent if growth is distribution 
neutral; and 5.43 if growth is anti-poor. The average per capita growth rate required for each country 
is presented in figure 6. 
Figure 6: Average per capita growth rates required to meet MDG 1 (2005-20015)
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For the pro-poor category, Cote d’Ivoire has the lowest growth requirement (0.68 percent) and Zambia 
has the highest (3.19 percent). However, for the Anti-poor category, Nigeria has the highest growth 
requirement (7.01 percent) and Ethiopia has the lowest requirement (1.72 percent). Given the per capita 
growth requirement for each category, the authors also computed the investment-saving gap necessary 
to achieve the target growth rate. The implied investment-saving gap for each country (as a percentage 
of GDP) is presented in table 6. For pro-poor growth, the average gap is 12.8 percent of GDP, for 
distribution neutral growth the gap is 15.5 percent, and for anti-poor growth the gap is 24.5 percent. 
In principle, the resource gap could be filled through increased ODA, private capital flows, or external 
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borrowing. However, given the debt situation of African countries and their limited access to private 
capital markets, ODA is the most viable source for financing this resource gap. Consequently, the authors 
also calculated the per capita foreign aid requirement. The results suggest that the average per capita 
GDP requirement across countries in 2002 US dollars is: $354 if growth is pro-poor; $380 if growth is 
distribution neutral; and $511 if growth is anti-poor.
Table 6: Implied Investment-Saving Gap (% of GDP)
 Pro-poor Distribution neutral Anti-poor
Burundi 24.28 25.79 29.43
Burkina Faso .80 4.42 26.05
Cote d'Ivoire .2 3.38 27.06
Cameroon 2.9 8.82 27.42
Ethiopia 3.90 4.92 6.72
Ghana 2.0 4.55 22.69
Guinea 3.00 6.28 6.0
Gambia 20.07 23.35 33.33
Kenya 7.06 0.28 24.40
Madagascar 9.92 22.62 27.24
Mozambique 22.47 24.46 27.45
Malawi 20.5 22.70 25.64
Nigeria -2.23 .65 4.26
Uganda 6.34 8.43 23.79
Zambia 8.62 2.3 26.24
Average 2.76 5.52 24.52
In recent years, several authors have identified methodological problems associated with these estimates of 
the cost of meeting the MDGs. Reddy and Heuty (2006) questions the reliability of existing estimates of 
the cost of achieving the MDGs. They argue that they are based on implausible and restrictive assumptions 
about growth rates, depend on poor quality data, and cannot be taken seriously given the presence of 
large uncertainties about the future. Easterly (2005) also argues that the estimates are unreliable because 
they are based on models that have been discredited in the economics literature. There are three models 
that are typically used for these estimates of the cost of the MDGs. The first is the financing-gap or 
two-gap model of growth which assumes that growth is proportional to investment and that the latter 
can be financed by domestic savings and foreign aid. In this setting, foreign aid is used to fill the gap 
between required investment and available domestic savings. The second is the poverty trap model which 
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assumes that poor countries are stuck in a poverty trap and would need massive aid in order to be on 
a path of sustained economic growth. The model used by Sachs et al (2004) is in this category. Finally, 
some researchers use the expenditure-to-outcomes model of health and education to derive estimates of 
meeting some of the sectoral goals in the Millennium Declaration. 
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IV. Alternative Proposals for Financing the MDGs
Having identified the costs of meeting the MDGs and the financing gap, recent efforts have been directed 
at how to fill the gap.  A number of developed countries have made commitments to scale-up aid but it is 
not clear if, and when, they will honour these commitments. This existence of a time lag between ODA 
pledges and fulfillment by donors has led to calls for new and innovative sources for financing the MDGs 
and development in general. 
Several proposals have been made on innovative and alternative approaches to financing development. 
The International Finance Facility (IFF) proposed by the UK government is one of the popular proposals 
that have attracted attention. It was first put forward by Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
in 2003. The main objective of the IFF is to front-load future aid commitments by borrowing from 
international capital markets. In order words, it will ensure that financial resources from future aid 
pledges are available for use by recipient countries in a timely manner. It is therefore a mechanism to 
ensure that donors honour their commitments and on time. Furthermore, it is a convenient approach 
to avoid the political constraints that prevent larger aid allocations in rich countries and will increase the 
stability as well as predictability of aid flows. 
Despite these advantages, critiques argue that, based on existing versions of the proposal, the IFF is 
unlikely to create additional resources for development. The reason is that it is expected to be executed 
through the issuance of bonds and interest needs to be paid on these bonds. With a large interest or 
premium on these bonds, the IFF may actually have a net effect on aid flows that is negative, especially if 
the premium is not paid by the donor governments. As a result of the attractiveness of the IFF approach 
to several donors, in September 2005, an International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) was 
launched to frontload $4 billion of commitments over ten years. France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Norway, 
the UK, and South Africa are already contributors to this facility.
Global taxes have also been proposed as potential sources of development finance. These include 
global environmental taxes, taxes on currency transactions (Tobin tax), and air-ticket taxes. In a sense, 
some of these are not really new proposals. For example, James Tobin put forward the idea of a 
currency transactions tax several decades ago, although the objective then was to reduce financial 
market volatility and not to use it as a source of development finance. Similarly, the idea of a global 
environment tax has a long history in the public finance literature. It has originally proposed as an 
incentive mechanism to reduce carbon emission and damage to the environment. However, in recent 
years it is considered as a potentially viable source of development finance. Recent research suggests 
that substantial amounts could be raised through minor environmental and currency transactions 
taxes. For example, Atkinson (2004) shows that a tax on gasoline of about 0.01 Euro per litre levied 
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on high-income countries could raise $50 billion dollars per year. Similarly, a tax of 2 basis points 
(0.02 percent) on currency transactions could raise $28 billion per year.  The main obstacle to the 
implementation of these taxes is that they require universal agreement by high-income countries and 
it is not clear that all parties will support the proposals. That said, one global tax proposal that has 
moved from concept into reality is the idea of an air-ticket tax. France and Chile were the first to enact 
legislation to levy taxes on airline tickets for use in financing development. The revenue or part of it 
will be put in a Global Fund set up to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. The legislation 
took effect in France in July 2006. At a Conference on Innovative Financing for Development, held 
in Paris in February 2006, eleven governments made commitments to implement the proposal. So far, 
eighteen countries have pledged to implement this tax. 
The issue of new Special Drawing Rights (SDR) with a development focus is another proposal that has 
been widely discussed. George Soros and the Zedillo Panel are major proponents of this idea. They are 
of the view that new SDRs should be created to fund global public goods and supplement aid flows to 
developing countries. The proposed use of SDRs for development finance is quite different from the role 
that they have played historically, which is to increase international liquidity. SDRs are interest-bearing 
international instruments issued by the International Monetary Fund and allocated to its members in 
proportion to their quotas. They supplement IMF members’ holdings of official reserve assets such as 
gold and foreign exchange reserves. Since the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, several developing countries 
have been accumulating foreign exchange reserves to reduce their vulnerability to financial crises. Part 
of this accumulation of reserves is financed by running current account surpluses and the other part 
is financed through borrowing on terms less generous than those that would be available on SDRs. 
In particular, the interest rates on these loans are several percentage points above those payable on 
SDRs. Consequently, the issue of new SDRs or a change in the allocation of current SDRs in favour of 
developing countries will reduce the real cost of borrowing to these countries and free-up some resources 
for financing development. The key challenge to creating new SDRs or reallocating existing ones in 
favour of developing countries is that any change in allocation that is not based on IMF quotas requires 
an amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement. But any amendment to the Articles of Agreement 
would require approval by 85 percent of the members and it is quite difficult to get the approval of large 
shareholders with veto power such as the United States. 
An increase in private donations has also been proposed as an alternative approach to financing 
development. However, given the fact that most private donations in rich countries are directed at 
domestic concerns rather than international development, it is unlikely that a substantial amount can 
be raised from this source. That said, to the extent that an increase in private donations encourage 
governments in rich countries to be more generous, it may play a vital role in mobilizing international 
resources for development. 
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Another proposal that has been made to finance development is to increase the flow of migrant 
remittances. This option is attractive because it is a stable source of capital flows and is often counter-
cyclical making it a source of social security for recipients. As indicated earlier, remittances already play 
a vital role in financing development in some developing countries such as South Asia and Middle East 
and North Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, its role is increasing but it is still less important compared to 
ODA. Remittances often finance consumption but are also used for financing infrastructure projects that 
are vital to reduce transactions costs and enhance competitiveness. The key policy that has been suggested 
for increasing the flow of remittances to developing countries is to reduce the cost of sending money by 
making bank services more accessible to migrants. 
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V. Initiatives and Commitments on Financing 
Development
This section presents and examines the key global initiatives and commitments on financing development 
made by donors since the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. These initiatives and commitments are reflected 
in the Monterrey Consensus, the Rome, Marrakech and Paris Declarations, and the G8 Gleneagles 
Summit Declaration.
The Monterrey Consensus
The Monterrey Consensus adopted by heads of state and government at the International Conference 
on Financing for Development, held 21-22 March 2002, represents the first comprehensive and global 
attempt to address the challenges of financing development in developing countries. It was also the 
first time that development-finance and related issues became the main focus in international financial 
discussions. In the Monterrey Consensus world leaders noted with concern the financial gap to be filled 
in order to attain the MDGs. They called for a new partnership between developed and developing 
countries and committed themselves to mobilizing domestic financial resources, attracting international 
capital flows, promoting international trade as an engine for development, increasing international 
financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief, 
and enhancing the coherence and consistency of international monetary, financial and trading systems 
for development. 
Regarding the mobilization of domestic resources, the Consensus emphasized the importance of an 
enabling domestic environment for mobilizing resources, increasing productivity, reducing capital flight, 
encouraging the private sector, and attracting international investment and assistance. It also stressed the 
importance of good governance, sound macroeconomic policies, investments in infrastructure, and the 
development of the financial sector in successfully mobilizing domestic resources for development. In 
the area of attracting international capital flows, the Consensus stressed the need for a transparent, stable, 
and predictable investment climate, enforcement of property rights, and sound macroeconomic policies 
and institutions. It also called on international and regional institutions to increase their support for 
private foreign investment in infrastructure development and other priority areas. 
The Consensus considers international trade as a very important external source of development finance. 
Consequently, it called for members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to implement the outcome 
of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha in November 2001. It also stressed the need 
to address the marginalization of LDCs in the multilateral trading system and emphasized the need for 
developed countries to grant duty and quota free market access for LDC exports into their markets. 
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It invited multilateral and bilateral financial and development institutions to support national efforts 
to benefit from trade and integrate into the multilateral trading system. It also encouraged developing 
countries to reduce trade barriers among themselves.
On ODA, the Monterrey Consensus stressed the need for concrete actions to be taken by donors to 
achieve the internationally agreed targets for ODA to developing countries of 0.7 percent of gross national 
product (GNP) and 0.15 - 0.20 percent for ODA to least developed countries (LDCs). It also called for 
actions to increase the effectiveness of aid. In this regard, donors were urged to take actions to harmonize 
aid, support and enhance efforts to untie aid, enhance the absorptive capacity of recipient countries 
to utilize aid, improve targeting of aid to the poor, and enhance recipient countries’ inputs into and 
ownership of technical assistance programmes. The need to explore innovative sources of financing was 
stressed with the understanding that such new sources should not unduly burden developing countries.
On external debt, the Consensus emphasized the importance of sustainable debt financing for mobilizing 
resources for investment and called on debtors and creditors to share responsibility for preventing and 
resolving unsustainable debt situations. In addition, it welcomed recent initiatives taken to reduce 
outstanding indebtedness and called for further measures, including debt cancellation, to deal with the 
unsustainable debt burdens of developing countries. It also stressed the need for flexibility in the application 
of the eligibility criteria for the enhanced HIPC and asked for future reviews of debt sustainability to take 
into account the impact of debt relief on the ability of recipients to achieve the MDGs.
Rome, Marrakech and Paris Declarations  
In the Monterrey Consensus, world leaders set the broad principles, guidelines, policies and actions for 
financing development. Although they highlighted the importance of aid harmonization for effective 
development outcomes in recipient countries, there were no clear guidelines and commitments from 
donors to ensure that the objective will be achieved until the High-Level Forum on Harmonization held 
24-25 February 2003, in Rome. In the Rome declaration, donors’ acknowledged the need to reduce 
transactions costs of aid delivery in recipient countries. They also stressed the need for country ownership 
of aid programmes and to implement good practice standards or principles in development cooperation. 
Against this background, they committed to: provide development assistance in accordance with partner 
country priorities, implement good practice standards or principles in development assistance delivery 
and management, adapt harmonization efforts to the country context, and harmonize donors’ policies 
and procedures. 
As a follow-up to the Rome declaration, an international roundtable on managing for development 
results was held in Marrakech in February 2004. The outcome of this meeting was the Joint Marrakech 
Memorandum endorsed by the heads of the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World 
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Bank, and the chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. In the memorandum, they committed to fostering a global partnership 
on managing for development results. 
While the Monterrey Consensus, the Rome declaration and the Marrakech Memorandum defined 
the main objectives for the aid effectiveness agenda and led to an expansion in activities aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of aid delivery, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness represents the 
first-bold attempt by donors’ and developing countries to take monitorable actions to reform the way 
aid is delivered and managed. The latter declaration was the outcome of the High-Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness held in Paris, 28 February – 2 March 2005. The Paris Declaration focused on five 
key areas necessary for aid effectiveness. These are: ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for 
results, and mutual accountability. Regarding ownership, the declaration stressed the need for partner 
countries to exercise effective leadership over their development policies and to co-ordinate development 
actions. On alignment, donors’ made commitments to base their overall support on partner countries’ 
national development strategies, institutions and procedures. They also made commitments to provide 
reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and to disburse aid in a timely and 
predictable fashion according to agreed schedules. Reducing the proportion of aid that is tied is also a key 
aspect of this area of the declaration.
In the area of harmonization, donors’ committed to make their actions more harmonized, transparent 
and collectively effective. On managing for results, they made commitments to manage and implement 
aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision making. Finally, 
regarding mutual accountability, donors’ and developing countries made commitments to enhance 
mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources. This requires holding both 
parties accountable for development outcomes. An important feature of the Paris Declaration is that 
indicators of progress and targets were set for each of the five areas to increase transparency in monitoring 
the implementation of agreed commitments.
The Gleneagles Declaration
The G8 Summit in Gleneagles in July 2005 added momentum to the commitments made by world 
leaders in Monterrey to increase aid flows and reduce the burden of external debt on developing countries 
to enhance their prospects for meeting the MDGs. The G8 declaration also recognized the need for 
substantial increase in official development assistance to consolidate and build on recent progress in 
Africa and stimulate the growth to reduce aid dependency. On aid, the declaration indicates that the 
commitments of G8 countries and other donors will increase ODA to all developing countries by $50 
billion a year by 2010 compared to 2004. Half of this increase will go to Africa, representing a more 
than doubling of aid to Africa compared to 2004. On debt, the G8 agreed to a proposal to cancel 100 
percent of outstanding debts of eligible HIPC to the IMF, International Development Association (IDA) 
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and African Development Fund, and to provide additional resources to ensure that the financial capacity 
of the international financial institutions is not reduced. They also re-affirmed their commitments 
to the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and stressed the need for developing countries and their 
governments to take the lead on development and be accountable for their actions. Table 7 presents 
some of the key commitments on aid and debt made to Sub-Saharan Africa by each G8 country at the 
Gleneagles Summit.
Table 7: G8 Commitments to Africa at Gleneagles
Country Interim Target Final Target
European Union • ODA/GNI target of 0.56 percent by 2010 
• Double ODA between 2004 and 2010
• 50 percent of the increase will go to Sub-Saharan 
Africa
• 0.7 percent by 2015
Germany • 0.51 percent ODA/GNI in 2010 • 0.7 percent in 205
Italy • 0.51 percent ODA/GNI in 2010 • 0.7 percent in 205
France • 0.5 percent ODA/GNI in 2007 of which two-third 
will go to Africa
• 0.7 percent in 202
United Kingdom • Double bilateral spending in Africa between 2003/4 
and 2007/8
• 0.7 percent in 203
United States • Double aid to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 
and 2010
Japan • Increase aggregate ODA volume by $10 billion 
over the next five years
• Double ODA to Africa over the next three years
Canada • Double international assistance from 2001 to 2010
• Double assistance to Africa from 2003/4 to 2008/9
Russia • Cancel $11.3 billion worth of 
debts owed by African countries
• Write off the entire stock of 
HIPC countries’ debts on non-
ODA loans
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VI. Translating Commitments into Results
In the past three decades, donors’ have made several promises and commitments to developing countries, 
and Africa in particular. However, some of these commitments have either not been complied with 
or have been partially implemented. Consequently, since the Monterrey Consensus several efforts 
have been made by both developed and developing countries to hold donors’ accountable for the 
pledges and commitments made to developing countries. For example, African Finance Ministers held 
a meeting on Financing for Development in Abuja, on 22 May 2006. As stated in the report of the 
conference, the meeting was a first step by African Finance Ministers to lead a process that translates 
development commitments into action. Against this background, this section focuses on the extent to 
which donors have lived up to their promises and pledges to Africa in three key areas: scaling-up of aid; 
improving aid effectiveness; and debt relief or debt cancellation. Due to data limitations, some parts of 
our analysis will focus on commitments made by the G8 countries with the understanding that there 
are other donors as well. 
Scaling-up Aid
The key target that donors have set for themselves on aid is to attain an ODA to GNI (Gross National 
Income) ratio of 0.7 percent. This target was set in 1969 and was supposed to be achieved by 1975. However, 
only a few countries have met the target. For example, in 2004, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands met the target. Countries such as Portugal, Belgium, France and Switzerland have 
also made significant progress although they are yet to meet the target. Among DAC Members, Japan, 
the United States, and Italy have the lowest ODA/GNI ratios. More effort is needed by these countries 
to increase the DAC average which was 0.26 percent in 2004 (Table 8).
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Table 8: ODA Amount and Ratios for DAC Members in 2004
Country ODA (US$ million) ODA/GNI (%)
Norway 299 0.87
Denmark 2037 0.85
Luxembourg 236 0.83
Sweden 2722 0.78
Netherlands 4204 0.73
Portugal 03 0.63
Belgium 463 0.4
France 8473 0.4
Switzerland 545 0.4
Ireland 607 0.39
United Kingdom 7883 0.36
Finland 655 0.35
Germany 7534 0.28
Canada 2599 0.27
Australia 460 0.25
Spain 2437 0.24
Austria 678 0.23
Greece 465 0.23
New Zealand 22 0.23
Japan 8906 0.9
United States 9705 0.7
Italy 2462 0.5
Total DAC 7952 0.26
The G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto, Canada, has developed a very useful methodology 
for assessing the extent to which G8 countries comply with the commitments made at their annual 
summits. The assessment uses a three-category scoring method: Full or near full compliance with a 
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commitment results in a score of +1; Complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment 
results in a score of -1; and an “inability to commit” or “work-in-progress” leads to a score of 0. An 
inability to commit refers to factors outside the executive branch that impedes the implementation of a 
commitment while “work-in-progress” refers to an initiative that has been launched by a government but 
is not yet near completion. Using this scoring methodology, the performance of the G8 countries in terms 
of meeting the commitments made to Africa and the developing world on scaling-up aid falls into the 
category “work-in-progress”.  This is because the G8 countries have only met part of the commitments 
made on scaling-up aid to developing countries and Africa in particular. One of the reasons while the 
G8 countries as a group have not fully complied with their commitments to scale-up aid to Africa is that 
some countries have not made much progress in following through on their commitments to double 
ODA to Africa. For example, Table 9 shows that Italy, Japan, and Russia have failed to implement 
their commitments and so have a score of -1. The United States, one of the big donors, has made some 
progress in complying with its commitments although it is not enough to double aid to Africa by 2010. 
In contrast, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union have all fully 
complied with their commitments in this area and so have a score of +1. 
Table 9: Compliance on Increasing Aid Quantity
Country Lack of compliance (-1)
Work-in-progress 
(0)
Full compliance 
(+1)
Canada X
France X
Germany X
Italy X
Japan X
Russia X
United Kingdom X
United States X
European Union X
Overall score X
 Aid Effectiveness
The quantity of aid is important but the overall effectiveness of any form of aid depends to a large extent 
on its quality. Consequently, in discussions on aid, it is now popular to talk about the quality of aid and 
how aid could be made more effective in recipient countries. There are various factors that determine the 
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overall quality of aid and hence its effectiveness. These include the proportion of aid that is tied, the extent 
to which aid is in the form of grants or concessional loans, the proportion of aid that goes to poor as 
opposed to relatively rich countries, the state of governance in recipient countries, and the administrative 
or transactions costs associated with aid. Table 10 presents the percentage of bilateral ODA from DAC 
Member countries to LDCs that is untied. To the extent that more than half of the LDCs are in Africa, 
the table captures their experience with tied aid as well. It is clear from the table that there has been a 
reduction in the percentage of aid from DAC Member countries that is tied. Over the period 1999-2001, 
55 percent of total DAC aid to LDCs was untied. In 2004, the number rose to 68 percent. Looking at 
individual DAC countries, however, there are wide differences in performance. For example, countries 
such as Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and the United Kingdom have successfully moved away 
from tied to untied aid. The United States, New Zealand, and Greece have a very low ratio of untied to 
total aid and so are at the bottom of the list. More progress needs to be made by these countries, especially 
the United States, if the DAC average is to improve significantly.  
Table 10: Proportion of Bilateral Aid to LDCs that is Untied (%)
1999-2001 (average) 2004
Australia 0.42 0.9
Austria 0.34 0.68
Belgium 0.49 0.99
Canada 0.40 0.76
Denmark 0.77 0.80
Finland 0.69 .00
France 0.54 0.85
Germany 0.43 0.66
Greece … 0.4
Ireland .00 .00
Italy 0.30 0.80
Japan 0.76 0.8
Luxembourg … .00
Netherlands 0.86 0.96
New Zealand … 0.36
Norway 0.99 .00
Portugal 0.42 0.99
Spain 0.25 0.95
Sweden 0.69 0.98
Switzerland 0.84 0.95
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1999-2001 (average) 2004
United Kingdom 0.62 .00
United States 0.0 0.03
Total DAC 0.55 0.68
Source: OECD (2006a)
Regarding the composition of aid, there has also been progress in this area. The share of grants in total 
ODA has increased over the years. For DAC countries, the average was roughly 49 percent over the period 
1980-84 (Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh 2006). For the 2003-2004 period the average is 90 percent (table 
11). In DAC countries such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
and New Zealand, grants represent 100 percent of ODA. At 60 percent, Japan has the lowest ratio of grant 
to total ODA. An improvement is needed in this area if Japan is to catch up with the other donors. The 
increasing share of grants in total ODA is a welcome development in African countries. Several countries 
in the region are already heavily indebted and are looking for ways to reduce their debt burden. Reducing 
the proportion of loans in total ODA prevents further accumulation of debts in these countries. 
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Table 11: Selected Terms and Conditions of ODA
Grant share of total 
ODA
(per cent)
BILATERAL ODA LOANS
Grant 
element
(per cent)
Average 
maturity
(years)
Average grace 
period
(years)
Average interest 
rate
(per cent)
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
Australia 00 00 - - - - - - - -
Austria 00 00 - - - - - - - -
Belgium 99.6 98.6 78. 83.5 29.8 29.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.0
Canada 99.6 00 90. - 38.3 - 4.0 - - -
Denmark 98.5 98.0 - - - - - - - -
Finland 98.8 98.7 - 48.6 - 7.9 - - 0.0
France 89.0 87.2 45.3 50.9 8.0 9.2 6.0- 7.9 3.0 2.3
Germany 9.9 85.0 68.0 62.7 35.4 32.4 7. 6.4 .4 .7
Greece 00 00 - - - - - 6.6 - -
Ireland 00 00 - - - - - - - -
Italy 87.7 95.7 90.7 90.4 38. 37.5 9.8 8.9 0.2 0.2
Japan 57. 59.7 70.9 72.3 33. 3.5 9.8 9.5 .5 .2
Luxembourg 00 00 - - - - - - - -
Netherlands 00 00 - - - - - - - -
New Zealnd 00 00 - - - - - - - -
Norway 98.0 98.7 - - - - - - - -
Portugal 99.8 99.9 - 6.2 - 3.8 22. - 3.3
 Spain 78.0 82.8 69.3 75.3 27.2 28.2 0.2 0. .3 0.7
Sweden 98.7 99.8 5.8 - 3.0 - -3.0 - 0.0 -
Switzerland 97.6 99.2 - - - - - - - -
United 
kingdom 92.8 94.8 - - - - - -
United states 99.7 99.8 68.3 68.3 30.0 30.0 5.0 5.0 .0 .0
 Total DAC 89.7 90.5 68.5 68.9 3.4 30. 9.5 9.2 .6 .4
Source: OECD (2006b)
The Center for Global Development has published an index of aid effectiveness that captures various 
aspects of aid quality. The index penalizes donors for tied aid, deducts debt repayments by poor to rich 
countries, favours aid to countries with good governance and high poverty rates, penalizes donors for 
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overloading recipient governments, and rewards governments that allow taxpayers to write –off charitable 
contributions. Based on the index for 2006, aid from Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway are 
the most effective (Roodman 2006). Japan, Italy, the United States and New Zealand had very low scores 
and hence aid effectiveness.
Debt Relief 
Debt relief is one area where G8 countries and other donors have made significant progress in meeting 
their commitments. At Gleneagles, they promised that all debts owed by eligible HIPC to IMF, IDA, and 
the African Development Fund would be cancelled. The G8 research Group has also examined the extent 
to which the G8 countries have honoured their commitments on debt relief. The results are presented 
in table 12. They show that all G8 countries have fully complied with their commitments on debt relief 
and so have a score of +1.  
Table 12: Compliance on Debt Relief 
Country Lack of compliance (-1)
Work-in-progress 
(0)
Full compliance 
(+1)
Canada X
France X
Germany X
Italy X
Japan X
Russia X
United Kingdom X
United States X
European Union X
Overall score 00 percent
The outstanding performance of the G8 in the area of debt relief is due in part to their commitment 
and support to the HIPC initiative and the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI). The HIPC 
initiative was established in 1996 to reduce debt burden of eligible countries. As a result of slow progress 
in attaining the debt reduction objective of the initiative, an enhanced version was launched on 1999 
with relatively less restrictive eligibility criteria. As of July 2006, 40 countries have either qualified or are 
currently considered or potentially eligible for debt relief under the initiative. Of the forty countries, 
nineteen have reached the completion point, ten have reached the decision point and eleven are pre-
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decision point countries (see table 13). In addition, of the nineteen countries that have reached the 
completion point, fifteen are in Africa. 
Table 13: Status of Countries under the HIPC Initiative (as of end-July 2006)
PostCompletion-Point Countries (19)
Benin Honduras Rwanda
Bolivia Madagascar Senegal
Burkina Faso Mali Tanzania
Cameroon Mauritius Uganda
Ethiopia Mozambique Zambia
Ghana Nicaragua
Guyama Niger
Interim Countries (Between Decision and Completion Point) (10)
Burundi The Gambia Sao Tome and Principe
Chad Guinea Sierra Leone
Republic of Congo Guinea-Bissau
Democratic Republic of the Congo Malawi
Pre-Decision-Point Countries (11)
Central African Republic Haiti Somalia
Comoros Kyrgyz Republic Sudan
Cote d’Ivoire Liberia Togo
Eritrea Nepal
Source: IDA and IMF (2006)
In addition to supporting debt relief under the HIPC initiative, G8 countries were also behind the 
launching of the MDRI in 2005 to reduce the debt burden of eligible HIPCs and provide additional 
resources for them to meet the MDGs. Under the MDRI, the IDA, IMF and African Development Bank 
(AfDB) will provide 100 percent debt relief on eligible debt to countries that have completed the HIPC 
process. Although these three institutions are responsible for delivery of debt relief under the MDRI, 
each institution has its own guidelines on how it intends to implement the agreements. For example, 
while only HIPCs are eligible for MDRI provided by the IDA and AfDB, the IMF also considers non-
HIPCs with per capita income of $380 or less. Furthermore, for the IMF and AfDB, eligible debt is debt 
disbursed outstanding debt as at end-2004. For the IDA, it is disbursed outstanding debt as at end-2003. 
Table 14 presents the main characteristics of the MDRI and HIPC initiatives. As at mid-July 2006, 
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committed assistance to African countries under the HIPC initiative and assistance delivered or expected 
to be delivered under the MDRI was US$50 billion. Of this amount, $34 billion was committed under 
the HIPC initiative and $15.9 billion was for the MDRI. Within the HIPC allocation, $21.6 billion 
represents assistance to the fifteen African countries that have reached the completion point as at mid-July 
2006, while $12.5 billion represents assistance to ten African countries that have reached the decision 
point.
Table 14: Main Characteristics of the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI
HIPC Initiative MDRI
Country coverage
IDA-only, PRFG-eligible countries 
with debt indicators above the HIPC 
Initiative thresholds, which have been 
engaged in qualifying IMF- and IDA- 
supported programs.
HIPC countries having reached 
completion point
Participating creditors
All multilateral, official bilateral and 
commercial creditors of external public 
and publicly guaranteed debt to HIPCs.
IDA, IMF and AfDF only.
Debt relief provided
External public and publicly guaranteed 
debt is reduced to the HIPC Initiative 
thresholds, as calculated at the time of 
the decision point
Debt disbursed before end-December 
2004 (IMF and AfDF) and end-
December 2003 (IDA) and still 
outstanding at the time of qualification 
(after the provision of HIPC Initiative 
debt relief) is reduced to zero
Modality of delivery
Different modalities.  Most multilateral 
and Paris Club creditors also provide 
interim debt relief.
Stock-of-debt operation at or shortly 
after the completion point.
Total costs of committed 
debt relief
US$41.3 billion in end-2005 Net 
Present Value (NPV) terms 
US$18.3 billion in end-2005 NPV 
terms
Source: IDA and IMF (2006)
In summary, while donors have made significant progress in meeting commitments on debt relief, 
they have made relatively less effort in fulfilling the pledges made on scaling-up aid and improving 
aid effectiveness. Urgent actions need to be taken in these areas to enable African countries obtain the 
required resources needed to attain the MDGs.
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VII. Issues arising from Recent Initiatives on Aid and Debt 
Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration there have been discussions and concerns on the 
consequences of the scaling up of aid and debt relief on African countries. There is no doubt that African 
countries need more aid flows to enable them increase the likelihood of achieving the MDGs. But 
more aid flows will also impose serious challenges on these economies and policymakers must prepare 
themselves to deal with these challenges if they are to maximize the benefits of aid and minimize the 
costs. Several papers have tried to identify the challenges facing African countries as a result of the recent 
decision by donors to scale-up aid to the region (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2006, Gupta, Powell and     
Yang 2006; Heller 2005). These challenges include: how to increase absorptive capacity of aid in recipient 
countries; how to prevent aid dependency; how to maintain domestic revenue levels during the period 
of increased aid flows; and how to ensure that aid does not lead to loss of competitiveness through real 
exchange rate overvaluation. In this section we discuss the issue of financial space for African economies 
as well as examine the economic consequences of scaling-up aid and debt relief to African countries.        
Financial Space for African Countries
The idea of fiscal space in dealing with the new financial opportunities to be made available to African 
countries has also been introduced in the literature. There is the view that African countries need fiscal 
space to deal with pressing infrastructure and social investments needed to achieve the MDGs. This view 
is interesting because it represents a big departure from the orthodox views on fiscal policy as advocated 
by the Washington Consensus. 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of the term “fiscal space,” it is often used to refer to the 
availability of budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose without 
any prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s financial position” (Heller 2005). We consider the 
concept of fiscal space, as in Heller (2005), too narrow to capture the issues raised by African countries on 
the need to have adequate resources to finance investments in infrastructure and other social programs. 
In particular, the notion of fiscal space focuses too much attention on domestic governments’ fiscal 
operations and less on other important sources of financing development. In this regard, we prefer to use 
the concept “financial space,” which is more comprehensive and takes into account the different actors 
and sources of financing development. Financial space here is defined as the ability of a government to 
mobilize external and internal financial resources to finance its development needs and priorities. This 
notion will encompass both the capacity of the government and the different actors of the economy 
including the banking system and the private sector to increase the level of available resources and at 
the same time improve the management of these resources through better governance of the economy. 
This notion of financial space also includes the capacity of a government to implement domestic reforms 
36
necessary to increase the resources available to it. There are several ways of increasing financial space in an 
economy. These include mobilization of domestic resources, foreign aid, debt relief, private capital flows 
etc. In the sub-sections below we examine the impact of two key aspects of financial space: scaling-up aid 
and debt relief. 
Scaling-up Aid
The international community has embarked on an important programme to increase aid to African 
countries and to improve its effectiveness. The most important objective of these efforts is to help African 
countries to meet the MDGs and to improve the life of millions of people living in poverty in the 
continent. The increase in aid flows has intensified debates on the macroeconomic consequences of aid 
in recipient countries, as reflected in the increasing literature on the subject (Bourguignon and Sundberg   
2006; Gupta, Powell and Yang 2006). Some of the issues raised in the literature include the Dutch disease             
problem, the effect on growth, the impact on fiscal sustainability and the issue of predictability of aid. We 
examine some of these issues in the following sub-section.
Dutch disease 
The “Dutch disease” effect is probably the most widely discussed potential adverse effect of an increase in 
aid flows. The idea is that in a small open economy where prices of traded goods determined on the world 
market, an increase in aid inflows may lead to an increase in the price of non-traded goods resulting in 
a real exchange rate appreciation. This appreciation of the real exchange rate will have a negative impact 
on the competitiveness of an economy. The assumption here is that a large part of the inflows is spent on 
non-traded goods. To the extent that this is not the case, the potential adverse effect of aid flows from this 
source may not be observed in an economy. It should be noted also that the possibility or potential for a 
Dutch disease effect also depends on the share of aid spent on productive investment relative to that spent 
on consumption of final goods. If aid is financing productive investment, it will improve productivity 
and enhance growth. In addition there will be less pressure on internal prices and a more muted change 
in the real exchange rate. 
The evidence from empirical studies on the impact of the scale-up of aid on the real exchange rate 
and relative prices is mixed. In a recent study of 13 African countries by Chowdhury and McKinley 
(2006), eight countries had a positive correlation between the net aid inflows and real exchange rates, 
suggesting that increased aid flows is accompanied by a depreciation of the real exchange rate. In five 
countries, the correlation is negative. For the link between the aid inflows and the inflation, the study 
suggests that the correlation for all the countries is positive, indicating that increasing aid is associated 
with an increase in inflation, and this has consequences for competitiveness of the economy. To examine 
the robustness of these results, we have computed the correlation between aid per capita and selected 
variables for all African countries for which we have data (table 15). As can be seen from the table, an 
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increase in aid has a significant and positive contemporaneous effect on the real effective exchange rate. 
Since the definition of the real effective exchange rate we used in the analysis is such that an increase 
represents a real appreciation, our results suggest that an increase in aid inflows leads to an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. However, it could be argued that it takes some time before the real effects of 
aid flows are felt in an economy. Consequently, we also computed the correlation using one-period lag of 
aid per capita. This did not result in any significant change in the results. Regarding inflation, both the 
contemporaneous and lagged correlation results suggest that there is no significant relationship between 
the two variables. In both cases the signs were negative but insignificant.
Table 15: Correlation of Aid with Selected Variables* 
Number of 
Observations Contemporaneous Lagged (one period)
Real effective exchange 
rate 235
0.8
(0.006)
0.92
(0.004)
Real GDP per capita 
growth 639
0.039
(0.332)
0.056
(0.7)
Health expenditure per 
capita 280
0.282
(0.000)
0.333
(0.000)
Education expenditure 
(% of total expenditure) 67
-0.054
(0.663)
-0.072
(0.564)
Inflation 639
-0.048
(0.226)
-0.050
(0.22)
* P-values in parenthesis
Our results therefore confirm the idea that the relationship between these variables varies across countries 
and possibly historical periods. Despite these mixed results, the potential for a Dutch disease is a real 
concern for African economies. But the risk could be mitigated by increasing the level of aid directed to 
productive investment to improve productivity and to help the economy respond to pressure from the 
demand side. 
Aid and growth
An important and compelling reason for increasing aid to Africa is to accelerate growth and increase the 
likelihood of attaining the MDGs in the region. Assessments of the performance of African countries 
show that it would be difficult for them to achieve the MDGs if current trends continue. Clearly, high 
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and sustained growth is needed to reduce poverty in African economies. Thus it is important to know if 
scaling up aid will accelerate growth in Africa. This issue has been discussed at length and several papers 
have examined the link between aid and growth (Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004, Burnside and 
Dollar 2000, Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2003). There are three main views on the relationship 
between aid and growth (Radelet 2006). The first is that aid has a positive effect on growth, but with 
diminishing returns as the volume of aid increases. The channels through which aid has a positive effect 
on growth include: augmenting savings and making it possible to finance investments; increasing worker 
productivity through investments in health or education; and providing a channel for the transfer of 
technology from rich to poor countries. The second view on the link between aid and growth is that aid 
has no effect on growth. Arguments put forward to support this view are that aid is often wasted, supports 
bad governments, reduces domestic savings, and undermines private sector incentives for investment. In 
addition, it is often argued that recipient countries do not have the capacity to absorb large amounts of 
aid. The third view on the relationship between the two variables is that aid has a conditional relationship 
with growth. In particular, it works best in countries with good institutions and policies. For example, 
a recent study on aid to African countries showed that in eleven of “good performance countries” high                 
growth is linked to high aid flows (Bourguignon, Gelb and Versailles, 2005, World Bank, 2005). To  
provide a simple test of these views, we computed the correlation between aid per capita and growth of 
real GDP per capita for all African countries for which data were available. Table 14 shows that for both 
contemporaneous and lagged correlations, the relationship is positive but insignificant at conventional 
levels.
Aid and fiscal sustainability
The potential effect of aid on fiscal sustainability has also been discussed in the literature (Heller, 2005). 
One of the key concerns here is the impact of increasing aid on fiscal attitudes as well as efforts of the 
recipient countries to collect tax and increase government revenues. There is a feeling that an increase in 
aid will not encourage countries to intensify domestic resource mobilization efforts and increase fiscal 
revenues. However, this view is not supported by evidence from recent studies indicating that the relation 
between aid and tax collection is very weak (Bourguignon, Gelb and Versailles, 2005). Another interesting 
and related issue here is that of public expenditure management. It has been argued that if higher aid 
inflows are used to finance labour-intensive public services (eg schools or clinics) that have large recurrent 
costs, then if there is an unexpected fall in aid levels, the ability of the government to continue with the 
provision of these services may be limited. Consequently, effective fiscal planning is crucial for economies 
dependent on aid flows.
Volatility of aid
A concern and challenge facing aid recipients is how to deal with uncertainty surrounding both aid 
commitments and disbursements. This concern is serious because recipient countries have to formulate 
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and implement medium-term development strategies and it is difficult to do this effectively if they 
are not certain about the timing and amount of aid that would be available to them over the horizon 
considered. The uncertainty surrounding aid is also a problem because studies have shown that it has 
negative consequences for output (Lensink and Morrisey 2000). Added to the volatility problem is the 
inefficiency resulting from conditions and procedures associated with aid delivery. In several countries, 
the multiplicity of donor programmes and their poor alignment with recipient government priorities 
often lead to inefficiencies. This inefficiency contributes to the weak impact of aid on growth and 
development. 
Provision of social services 
Aid is often used to finance the provision of social services, especially health and education. The idea 
is that these investments would have a positive effect on productivity and hence growth and poverty 
reduction. Table 15 shows that there is a strong positive and statistically significant relationship between 
health expenditure per capita and aid per capita. This relationship holds for both contemporaneous 
and lagged aid. With regard to education, the results indicate that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between aid per capita and the share of education in total government expenditure. 
Debt Relief 
Debt relief is one of the major components or sources of the expected increase in resources to African 
countries to help them finance activities and actions needed to meet the MDGs. As at mid-July 2006, total 
HIPC initiative assistance commitment and assistance delivered or expected to be delivered to African 
countries under the MDRI was about $50 billion. If donors follow through on their commitments, this 
will represent a significant inflow of resources to eligible African countries. It will also present challenges 
to these countries. These include how to manage the additional resource flows emanating from debt 
relief and ensure that they are effectively used for poverty reduction; how to increase domestic absorptive 
capacity to absorb these inflows and ensure that they do not result in real exchange rate appreciation and 
a reduction in export competitiveness; and how to ensure that current debt relief does not encourage 
excessive new borrowing and the accumulation of further debt. As indicated earlier, one of the main 
objectives of debt relief is to free-up resources for financing social programs that are expected to have 
significant impact on poverty reduction. In this section we examine the link between debt relief and 
social expenditure, inflation and growth. 
Debt relief and social expenditures
There is the widely-held view that debt relief will free-up resources for financing social programs that are           
vital for alleviating poverty. In particular, debt relief is expected to lead to an increase in expenditures on 
education and health, which is expected to have positive effects on productivity and hence contribute to 
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poverty reduction. Despite the popularity of these views, it is not clear that an increase in debt relief will 
actually boost social expenditures. Recent empirical studies have tried to examine the extent to which 
debt relief leads to an increase in social expenditures. For example, Chavin and Kraay (2005) examined 
the link between debt relief and social expenditures. They found no evidence of a statistical relationship 
between debt relief granted over the period 1989-1993 and the share of government expenditure on 
health and education over the period 1994 to 1998. That said, they also found that debt relief between 
1994-1998 was associated with an increase in the shares of education and health in total spending 
over the period 1999-2003, although the evidence is not robust. In terms of country-specific evidence, 
Nannyonjo (2001) argues that in Uganda, debt relief had a positive impact on social expenditures in the 
late 1990s, particularly in the education and health sectors. Dessy and Vencatachellum (2006) have also 
examined this issue using African data. They found that debt relief had a positive impact on the share of 
education and health in total spending over the period 1989-2003.
Debt relief and growth
One of the concerns about the high external debt of poor countries is that it stifles growth and so makes 
it even more difficult for a country to generate enough resources to repay its existing stock of debt. 
High debt can reduce growth through its negative impact on investment. It can also reduce growth by 
reducing the incentives of governments to adopt structural reforms. Several attempts have been made to 
examine the link between debt and growth. However, until recently, most of the studies use data for both 
emerging markets and low income countries without taking into account the fact that the heterogeneity 
between emerging markets and low income countries has implications for the relationship between debt 
and growth. For example, unlike emerging markets, low income countries have very limited access to 
international capital markets. In addition, they have relatively different economic structures and rely on 
foreign aid. These differences suggest that the relationship between debt and growth will differ across the 
two groups of countries. In a recent study, Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) found that external debt 
has a negative effect on growth after a critical threshold for debt is reached. In particular, they found 
that when the Net Present Value of debt is greater than 160-170 percent of exports and 35-40 percent 
of GDP, external debt stifles growth. With regard to the link between debt relief and growth, Clements, 
Bhattacharya and Nguyen (2005) present evidence suggesting that debt relief under the HIPC initiative 
will add 0.8-1.1 percentage points to the annual per capita GDP growth rates of the countries in their 
sample. These findings support the widely-held view amongst African policy makers that debt relief will 
increase the prospects for growth and development in the region.
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